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NOTES
THE ELIGIBILITY OF THE UNBORN CHILD
UNDER AFDC
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program (AFDC)'
is a categorical assistance program established by the Social Secu-
rity Act of 1935.2 The purpose of the program is to provide assistance
to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom
they are living.3 All needy children who have been denied parental
care and support and who satisfy certain age and educational cri-
teria are eligible for assistance.4
There has recently been considerable litigation concerning the
eligibility of unborn children under the AFDC program.' In each
1. Aid to Families With Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44
(1970) [hereinafter cited as AFDC].
2. The other established programs are: Old-Age Survivors and Dis-
ability Benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-431 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§
430-31 (Supp. II, 1973); Aid to the Blind, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-06 (1970); Aid
for the Permanently and Totally Disabled, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-55 (1970).
3. AFDC § 601.
4. Id. § 606.
5. Taylor v. Hill, 377 F. Supp. 495 (D.N.C. 1974); Wisdom v. Norton,
372 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Conn.), rev'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 2173 (2d Cir. Oct. 29,
1974); Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51 (M.D. Fla.), cert. in advance of
judgment denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3203 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1974); Poole v. Endsley,
371 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Fla.), cert. in advance of judgment denied sub
nom. Mixon v. Keller, 43 U.S.L.W. 2173 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1974); Carver v.
Hooker, 369 F. Supp. 204 (D.N.H. 1973), aff'd, No. 74-1079 (1st Cir. July
18, 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3138 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1974)
(No. 74-242); Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. Supp. 798 (D. Mass. 1973);
Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Green v. Stanton,
364 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Wilson v. Weaver, 499
F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974); Harris v. Mississippi State Dep't of Public Wel-
fare, 363 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. Miss. 1973); Doe v. Lukhard, 363 F. Supp.
823 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974), petition for cert.
filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3699 (U.S. June 18, 1974) (No. 73-1763); Alcala v.
Burns, 362 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 743 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3187 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974); Wilson v.
Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir.
1974); Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
case, a pregnant woman was seeking to enjoin her state of residence
from denying benefits to her on behalf of her unborn child. The
decisions have focused on the issue of whether unborn children come
within the definition of "dependent child" as set forth in AFDC
section 606.6 If unborn children are included, a state program deny-
ing AFDC benefits to the unborn would be invalid under the Supre-
mecy Clause because the state is using federal funds.7 The source
of the controversy is that no reference is made to unborn children
in AFDC's definition of "dependent child."8 Consequently, a diffi-
cult question of statutory construction is raised. Thus far, fourteen
of seventeen reported decisions have included unborn children
within the statutory definition.'
6. AFDC section 606(a) defines the term "dependent child" as a
"needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by
reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or
mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother,
grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, step-
brother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place
of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own
home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) under the age
of twenty-one and (as determined by the State in accordance with stan-
dards prescribed by the Secretary) a student regularly attending a school,
college, or university, or regularly attending a course of vocational or tech-
nical training designed to fit him for gainful employment."
7. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, provides that: "This Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in-Pursuance thereof...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding." AFDC section 602(a)(10) directs that
AFDC benefits be furnished "with reasonable promptness to all eligible
individuals." Consequently,'if unborn children are deemed to be eligible
within the meaning of the statutory definition of "dependent child," a
state program must conform to the federal standards by making benefits
available to unborn children. Although all the unborn child cases have
been decided under the supremacy clause by means of statutory construc-
tion, it should be noted that equal protection challenges were also raised
in all of the Cases. The courts, however, adhered to the general rule that
"[a]ny doubt must be resolved in favor of [a] construction to avoid the
necessity of passing upon the equal protection issue." Townsend v. Swank,
404,U.S. 282, 291 (1971).
8. See note 6 supra.
9. See cases cited note 5 supra. Only Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp.
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Prior to the late 1960s, state welfare programs were reviewed al-
most exclusively by the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (HEW). 0 In recent years, however, litigants have turned to the
federal courts as a forum for challenging state welfare programs."
620 (N.D. Ga. 1973), Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51 (M.D. Fla. 1974),
and Wisdom v. Norton, 43 U.S.L.W. 2173 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1974), have
disagreed. See also Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1974)
(dissenting opinion).
10. To be eligible for state welfare funds, states must submit their
plans to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare for approval. 42
U.S.C. §§ 301, 601, 1201, 1351 (1970). The Secretary may at any time
during the administration of a state plan cut off funds if he finds that there
has been substantial non-compliance with conditions imposed by statute
or regulation. Id. §§ 304, 604, 1204, 1354. The state does have a right to a
hearing. Id. It may in the event of an adverse decision avail itself of judicial
review in the federal circuit courts. Id. § 1316. See Note, Federal Judicial
Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 84, 91 (1967). •
11. Most challenges to welfare laws have been founded on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970) which provides: "Every person who, under color of any stat-
ute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper
proceeding for redress." 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) provides district courts
with jurisdiction "[t]o redress the deprivation, under color of any State
law, statute, ordinance or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States." There has been considerable controversy concerning
whether the incompatibility of a state law and the Social Security Act is
a violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983, or whether federal courts have suffi-
cient subject matter jurisdiction over such a claim under 28 U.S.C. section
1343(3). In Hagans v. Lavine, 94 S. Ct. 1372 (1974), the Supreme Court
affirmed the general rule that in order to bring an action under section
1983, a plaintiff has to allege a constitutional claim. If this claim is of
sufficient substance to support federal jurisdiction, then a district court
could hear as a matter of pendent jurisdiction the claim of conflict between
federal and state law, without deciding whether the statutory claim was
itself encompassed in section 1343. Id. at 1379. The Court also affirmed the
right of a district court judge to decide the statutory claim without first
having the constitutional claim decided by a three judge court. Id. at 1382.
Though many of the unborn child decisions address these issues, the juris-
dictional questions are beyond the scope of this Note.
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-Basic to this development has been a change in attitude towards the
nature of public welfare. Although still not denominated a funda-
mental right, 2 welfare is no longer viewed as a mere gratuity fur-
nished at the state's discretion. 13 An alternative explanation for this
increase, however, might be the greater availability of legal aid
services and public neighborhood, law offices.'"
Much of welfare litigation has arisen from inconsistencies be-
tween state imposed eligibility requirements and those provided by
the controlling federal act. 5 Challenges made against eligibility
requirements in respect to the AFDC program have been frequent
and often successful, due to a strict rule for reviewing state welfare
programs that has emerged from three Supreme Court cases." The
12. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court, in review-
ing a challenge to a state welfare program on equal protection grounds,
stated: "[H]ere we deal with state regulation in the social and economic
field, not affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights ... ." Id. at
484.
13. See Note, Social Welfare-An Emerging Doctrine of Statutory
Entitlement, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 603 (1969). "The traditional legal ap-
proach to the interest of the individual in government largesse, such as
pensions and poor relief, has been to categorize whatever he was entitled
to receive under a statutory programs as a 'gratuity' to which he had no
'vested right' and which could be granted, withheld or conditioned at the
complete discretion of the legislature." Id. at 609; see Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) (footnote omitted). "It may be realistic today to regard
welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than, a 'gratuity.'" Id. at 262
n.8.
14. See, e.g., Comment, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in
Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARV. L. REV. 805 (1970).
15. See, e.g., Lopez v. Vowell, 471 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973) (invalidated a state welfare provision denying
benefits to caretakers of needy dependent children if the caretakers were
married and living with their spouses); Lawson v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 203
'(W.D. Va. 1972) (invalidated a state welfare provision that excluded chil-
dren between the ages of 16-18 from AFDC eligibility if they did not attend
school).
16. Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank,
404 U.S. 282 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). In Townsend v.
Swank, an Illinois welfare provision excluded from AFDC eligibility chil-
dren between the ages of 18-20 who attended colleges and universities. The
Court held that this provision was in direct conflict with the definition of
"dependent child" found in the 'Social Security Act. 404 U.S. at 285. In
[Vol. III
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rule was articulated by Mr. Justice Brennan in Townsend v. Swank:
[Alt least in the absence of Congressional authorization for the exclusion
clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a
state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under
federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore
invalid under the Supremacy Clause. 7
The authority for this rule is a provision of AFDC requiring that
payments "shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all
eligible individuals.'
8
The Townsend rule has been the main authority cited in those
decisions favoring inclusion of unborn children under the AFDC
program."' However, before courts could apply the rule, they first
had to determine whether the definition of "dependent child" found
in AFDC could be construed to encompass the unborn child. This
has proven to be no easy task. Legislative history shows no evidence
of congressional intent either to include or exclude unborn chil-
dren.20 Consequently, the courts have relied on other evidence of
congressional intent for their decisions. Particular emphasis has
been placed on an administrative policy which permits participat-
ing states the option of making payments to unborn children'
Carleson v. Remillard, the Court struck down a California welfare provi-
sion that excluded from AFDC eligibility any child whose father was ab-
sent due to military leave. 406 U.S. at 603. In King v. Smith, the Court
invalidated an Alabama welfare provision that excluded from AFDC eligi-
bility any mother cohabiting with a man not obligated by Alabama law to
support her child. The Court held that such a "substitute father" did not
come within the meaning of "parent" in the Social Security Act. 392 U.S.
at 327.
17. 404 U.S. at 286.
18. AFDC § 602(a)(10).
19. See, e.g., Green v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ind. 1973). The
ultimate question is "whether congressional authorization for the exclusion
of unborn children from eligibility for AFDC under the definition of 'de-
pendent child' is 'clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its
legislative history.'" Id. at 125.
20. AFDC "bespeaks no specific intent on the part of Congress in re-
spect of either the exclusion or inclusion of the unborn child." Carver v.
Hooker, 369 F. Supp. 204, 212 (D.N.H. 1973).
21. The court in Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1973),
presented the early history of this policy. The state of Wisconsin made
payments available to children " 'from six months before to six months
19741
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
"when the fact of pregnancy has been determined by medical diag-
nosis.""
, The courts which have favored inclusion of unborn children
within the AFDC program have applied a dual standard in their
interpretation of this policy. While they have accepted HEW's au-
thorization of payment to unborn children as manifesting the will
of Congress, they have also declared its optional aspect invalid.23
As justification for this determination, the courts have adopted a
syllogistic reasoning. They submit as their major premise the
Townsend rule which mandates payments of AFDC benefits to all
eligible individuals. Their minor premise is that unborn children are
eligible through authorization of HEW. The conclusion, therefore,
is that it is mandatory, and not at the state's option, that unborn
children receive AFDC benefits.24 Such reasoning, however, is based
on the presupposition that HEW's optional policy permitting pay-
ment of AFDC benefits to unborn children automatically makes
them eligible within the meaning of the Townsend rule and AFDC.
The courts that have found unborn children to be within the
eligibility standards of the AFDC program have been able to justify
this position because of the general policy that "the construction of
a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed
unless there are compelling indications it is wrong."2 Since Con-
gress has acquiesced in the payment of benefits to unborn children
after the birth of the child'" under its state program. In 1941, an audit
exception to these payments was waived by the Social Security Board with
the understanding that exceptions also would not be taken to similar pay-
ments in the future. Id. at 625 n.5.
22. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90 (1973).
23. In Doe v. Lukhard, 363 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Va. 1973), the court
admitted: "As the present defendants and the Parks court note, it appears
anomolous to rely on HEW interpretation of eligibility but not on HEW
interpretation of the optional nature of the program." Id. at 828.
24. An argument was made by HEW that its authority for making such
coverage optional is that the provisions of AFDC section 602 are mandatory
on the states while the requirements of AFDC section 606 are not. See notes
7, 19 supra. The court in Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill.
1973) rejected this argument, interpreting AFDC section 606 as defining
"dependent child" for purposes of the entire AFDC subchapter of the Act.
Id. at 1153.
25. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
[Vol. III
NOTES
for over thirty years, the courts reason that such payments are
compatible with the intent of Congress."6 Furthermore, Congress'
recent failure to enact amendments to AFDC which would have
expressly excluded the unborn is construed to be further evidence
of its acknowledgement of the unborn child's eligibility."
However, it is still to be determined whether Congress' acquiesc-
ence is predicated only on the policy's optional aspect. If this is the
case, it would seem that the unborn child should not be considered
an eligible individual within the meaning of AFDC."8 Consequently,
further clarification of congressional intent is necessary. As was
noted earlier, legislative history of the AFDC program provides little
assistance."9 Courts favoring mandatory eligibility for unborn
children have therefore relied on two other indices of congressional
intent.
The courts examined the overall goals of AFDC itself. In King v.
Smith,30 the Supreme Court declared the "paramount goal" of the
AFDC program to be the protection of needy children.3 ' Courts de-
26. The court in Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1973),
noted that "even if the unborn child was not within the contemplation of
Congress at the time the Act was passed, HEW and its predecessors have
authorized the payments of benefits on behalf of the unborn since at least
1941." Id. at 1154.
27. In 1972, Congress made substantial amendments to the Social Se-
curity Act. While no changes were made to the AFDC sections of the Act,
the proposed amendments contained a provision that would have elimi-
nated payment for unborn children even on an optional basis. "Regula-
tions of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare permit Aid to
Families with Dependent Children payments for a child who has not yet
been born. The Committee [Senate Committee on Finance] bill would
make unborn children ineligible for AFDC." STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON
FINANCE, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF
H.R. 1 AS DETERMINED BY THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE 94 (Comm. Print
1972).
28. In Doe v. Lukhard, 363 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Va. 1973), the court
stated that if an unborn child is not a child for purposes of AFDC section
606, then the policy of granting payments .to unborn children is violative
of AFDC section 603, which provides that the federal government may
match payments made only to eligible individuals. Id. at 829.
29. See notes 20-27 supra and accompanying text.
30. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
31. Id. at 325.
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ciding in favor of including unborn children within the scope of
AFDC felt that the word "child" should be interpreted in light of
this goal.2 Since pre-natal nutrition, and medical care are obviously
essential to the unborn child's future well-being, these courts rea-
soned that the definition of "dependent child" should encompass
the fetus. 3 Such reasoning, however, seems insufficient by itself to
support a finding of eligibility. The Townsend rule is one of "statu-
tory entitlement" rather than one of "statutory intent."'" Conse-
quently, the requirements of the Townsend rule cannot be satisfied
by simply finding that a classification is consistent with the overall
purpose of AFDC. Further evidence of congressional intent is neces-
sary before unborn children could be conclusively determined to be
eligible within the meaning of "dependent child" in AFDC.
As further evidence, the courts offered the dictionary definition
32. The court stated in Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill.
1973): "[A]ny uncertainty about the meaning of the word child should be
resolved in light of the broad remedial goals of the AFDC program, which
are stated at , . . [AFDC] § 601." Id. at 1154 (footnote omitted).
33. However, it should be noted that these needs are provided for in
42 U.S.C. §§ 701-15 (1970). The court in Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51
(M.D. Fla. 1974), noted that "an omission from Title IV [AFDC §§ 601-
44] could only be intentional when one examines Title V [42 U.S.C.
§§ 701-15] of the Social Security Act where Congress specifically includes
mention of pre-natal care and prospective motherhood and childbearing."
Id. at 54.
34. The "statutory entitlement" theory was stated by the district court
in Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Ala. 1967), aff'd, 392 U.S. 309(1968): "Aid to Dependent Children financial assistance is a statutory
entitlement under both the laws of Alabama and the federal Social Secu-
rity Act, and where the child meets the statutory eligibility requirements,
he has a right to receive financial benefits under the program." Id. at 38(emphasis added). See Note, Social Welfare-An Emerging Doctrine of
Statutory Entitlement, 44 NoTRE DAME LAW. 603 (1969). Before King, the
test that was applied to state welfare programs was referred to as "Condi-
tion X," embodied in a regulation found in 45 C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1)(ii)(1973), which reads: "The groups selected for inclusion in the plan and the
eligibility conditions imposed must not exclude individuals or groups on
an arbitrary or unreasonable basis, and must not result in inequitable
treatment of individuals or groups in the light of the provisions and pur-
poses of the public assistance titles of the Social Security Act." See Note,
Welfare's Condition X, 76 YALE L.J. -1222 (1967).
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of child, which encompasses both the born and the unborn." In
Harris v. Mississippi State Department of Public Welfare,"6 the
court stated: "As a general rule words used in the statute are to be
given their usual and commonly understood meaning, unless it is
plain from the statute that a different meaning is intended."37 How-
ever, dictionary definitions notwithstanding, it is questionable
whether a fetus is included in the common day usage of the word
"child.13 8
There is a differentiation between the born and unborn child
regarding constitutional rights. The Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade 39 held that the word "person" as used in the fourteenth
amendment does not include the unborn." Therefore, arguably, a
state's exclusion of the unborn from AFDC benefits might survive
an equal protection challenge. However, the unborn child cases have
been decided on non-constitutional grounds and, therefore, Roe
seems inapplicable. As an alternative approach, the legal status of
the unborn child in reference to public welfare benefits could be
analogized to the law of property where the unborn's right is recog-
nized from the moment of conception. 4 Regardless, arguments
founded on either the legal or constitutional status of the unborn do
not clarify what Congress intended by the word "child" and there-
fore are of questionable merit.
Parks v. Harden,4" Mixon v. Keller,43 and Wisdom v. Norton,4 the
cases which held in favor of excluding unborn children from manda-
tory AFDC eligibility, focused their opinions on refuting the argu-
ments offered in support of inclusion by the other courts."' An
35. Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1957) defines child
as "an unborn or recently born human being."
36. 363 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. Miss. 1973).
37. Id. at 1296.
38. "As a matter of semantics, there simply is no way to conclude that
the word 'child' includes something else which is not a 'child,' namely an
unborn child." Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620, 623 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Id. at 157.
41. See Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical
Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349 (1971).
42. 354 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
43. 372 F. Supp. 51 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
44. 43 U.S.L.W. 2173 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1974).
45. See riotes 33, 38 supra.
1974]
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affirmative argument made by Mixon was that certain provisions of
AFDC are only logical if the term "child" is limited to born chil-
dren.'"
Recognizing that congressional intent is unclear, perhaps a better
analysis is that each decision turns on the interpretation given the
Townsend rule by a particular court. The courts holding in favor of
unborn children have opted for a reading of the rule that first exam-
ines the term "child" to determine whether such a term is broad
enough to include coverage under AFDC, and secondly, requires a
congressional showing of "specific exclusion" before the unborn
could be denied benefits. 7 It might be argued that a different read-
ing was given by the courts denying benefits. These courts seem to
have interpreted the Townsend rule as requiring a finding of eligibil-
ity only upon a showing of "specific inclusion" of the class in either
the legislative history or in AFDC itself.4" Wilson v. Weaver stated
that such an interpretation was clearly not the law. 9 The Townsend
rule itself speaks of "specific exclusion" rather than "specific inclu-
sion."5 Therefore, it would seem that the approachin Wilson and
other decisions favoring the inclusion of unborn children squares
with the Townsend rule. Such an interpretation would also be con-
sistent with the rule of construction that remedial legislation is
46. See, e.g., AFDC sections 602(a)(7) and (8), which require consider-
ation of the child's income and resources in establishing the amount of
assistance. AFDC section 602(a)(11) requires notice to law enforcement
officials when the state furnishes aid to a "child who has been deserted or
abandoned by his parent." Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51, 54 (M.D. Fla.
1974).
47. "Under color of Townsend, King, and Carleson, plaintiffs have ad-
vanced the theory of 'specific exclusion' saying that the fetus must be
covered by the Social Security Act since unborns are not 'specifically ex-
cluded' by the Act. This construction does violence to the actual intent
expressed by the Supreme Court in the above cases. The attempt to shift
the burden to the defendant to prove that an item not expressly excluded
is thereby included is inverted logic and will not stand." 372 F. Supp. at
55.
48. The court in Alcala v. Burns, 362 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Iowa 1973),
stated that: "Judge Smith in Parks v. Harden, when he searched the
statute and legislative history, was looking for a very specific inclusion of
'unborn children' which he did not find." Id. at 185.
49. 358 F. Supp. 1147, 1152 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
50. 404 U.S. at 286.
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traditionally interpreted broadly to effectuate its purposes, with
exceptions narrowly construed.' However, two recent Supreme
Court decisions" have raised some question as to the scope and
meaning of Townsend. Conceivably the reasoning of Parks, Mixon,
and Wisdom could find support in these two decisions.
In Jefferson v. Hackney,53 the Supreme Court upheld Texas'
method of computing AFDC benefits.54 The Court's decision was
consistent with a state's right to establish the standard of need and
determine the level of benefits.55 However, the effect of this particu-
lar scheme was a denial of benefits entirely to certain families whose
income was less than their standard of need. 6 Consequently, an
argument could be made that Texas' provision denied benefits to
51. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
52. New York State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405
(1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
53. 406 U.S. 535.
54. Texas' method was a variation of the ratable reduction method of
limiting welfare payments. The Supreme Court, in Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397 (1970), approved the use of ratable reduction under which a
family :eligible for AFDC payments has its standard of need reduced by
multiplying the standard by a certain percentage. For example, a family
with a 200 standard of need residing in a state which uses a fifty percent
reductlon factor would be eligible for benefits of $100. In the method chal-
lenged in Rosado, income was subtracted before applying the reduction
factor. In Jefferson, Texas applied the factor first and then subtracted the
income. Consequently, if the family in the hypothetical presented above
had income of $100, they would not be entitled to any benefits whatsoever.
See generally, Note, 1 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 322 (1972), Note, What Re-
mains of Federal AFDC Standards After Jefferson v. Hackney?, 48 IND.
L.J. 281 (1972).
55. "There is no question that states have considerable latitude in
allocating their AFDC resources, since each state is free to set its own
standard of need and to determine the level of benefits by the amount of
funds it devotes to the program." King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19
(1968) (footnotes omitted).
56. If a family had a standard of need of $200 and an income of $100,
and if in Texas the percent reduction factor was fifty percent, the percen-
tage reduction factor would be applied to the standard of need before
subtracting income. In the above hypothetical this would result in a pay-
ment of $0 even though the family had income ($100) which was less than
their standard of need ($200).
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individuals eligible under AFDC provisions and was therefore in-
valid according to Townsend. Yet the Court upheld the variance,
placing emphasis on the fact that the eligibility requirements in
controversy concerned the administration of a welfare program,
which is more within the competence of the state than the judici-
ary. 57
More recently, in Dublino v. New York Department of Social
Services," the Court reviewed independent state work programs for
AFDC recipients. The program provided conditions for eligibility in
addition to those provided by the AFDC in its Work Incentive Pro-
gram (WIN)."' Since there was a conflict of conditions of eligibility,
Townsend would appear to control. However, the Court approved
the state program, finding a lack of congressional intent that would
require its preemption by WIN.6"
The holdings of Jefferson and Dublino would seem to restrict the
scope of Townsend. One interpretation of Jefferson is that it limits
57. "Section 402(a)(10) [AFDC § 602(a)(10)] also prohibits a State
from creating certain exceptions to standards specifically enunciated in
the federal Act. It does not, however, enact by implication a generalized
federal criterion to which States must adhere in their computation of stan-
dards of need, income, and benefits. Such an interpretation would be an
intrusion into an area in which Congress has given the States broad discre-
tion, and we cannot accept appellants' invitation to change this longstand-
ing statutory scheme simply for policy consideration reasons of which we
are not the arbiter." Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. at 545 (citation and
footnote omitted).
58: 413 U.S-405.
59. The main question in this case was whether the WIN program was
intended to pre-empt state independent work programs that would provide
additional conditions of eligibility for AFDC recipients. The WIN program,
,AFDC section 630,, was enacted as part of the 1967 amendments to the
Social Security Act, whereby states were required to incorporate WIN into
their Aid to Families With Dependent Children plans. See Note, AFDC
Eligibility Conditions Unrelated to Need: The Impact of Dublino, 49 IND.
L.J. 334 (1974).
60. "In sum, our attention has been directed to no relevant argument
which supports,'except in the most peripheral way, the view that Congress
intended, either expressly or impliedly, to pre-empt state work programs.
Far more would be required to show the 'clear manifestation of [con-
gressional] intention' which must exist before a federal statute is held to
'supersede the exercise of state action.'" 413 U.S. at 417 (citation omit-
ted).
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Townsend to eligibility criteria unrelated to need." Dublino appears
to prohibit the application of Townsend to cases concerning pre-
emption of state welfare programs by federal programs.12 The un-
born child cases, however, do not fall into either of the two catego-
ries affected by Jefferson and Dublino and therefore would still
appear to be subject to Townsend.
Jefferson and Dublino appear to be more pertinent to the unborn
child cases for their language than for their holdings. Both seem to
concur in the interpretation given Townsend by Parks, Mixon, and
Wisdom. 1 Jefferson speaks of AFDC prohibiting "a state from cre-
ating exceptions to standards specifically enunciated in the Federal
Act."6 Dublino distinguishes King, Townsend, and Carleson v.
Remillard5 stating: "In those cases it was clear that state law ex-
cluded people from AFDC benefits who the Social Security Act
expressly provided would be eligible.""
It is difficult, however, to discern the exact import of these two
statements. If the Court is interpreting Townsend as requiring a
finding of eligibility only upon a showing of "specific inclusion" of
a class, then the Townsend rule is an inappropriate test to apply in
the unborn child cases. The decisions have demonstrated that con-
gressional intent concerning AFDC eligibility of the unborn is am-
biguous at best. 7 Such an interpretation is difficult, however, to
reconcile with the canon of construction that remedial statutes are
to be construed broadly to give the benefit of doubt to the challeng-
61. Note, What Remains of Federal AFDC Standards After Jefferson
v. Hackney?, 48 IND. L.J. 281, 286 (1972).
62. In Green v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ind. 1973), the court
presented the following analysis of Dublino: "Thus the Court held merely
that the WIN program was not intended to pre-empt state work incentive
legislation, thereby invalidating even complimentary state provisions in
their entirety, including provisions not in actual conflict with the Social
Security Act. . . . The instant case, unlike Dublino. . . does not involve
a question of pre-emption. The exclusion of unborn children from eligibil-
ity for AFDC involves a 'conflict of substance' with the federal requirement
that aid be furnished to 'all eligible individuals.'" Id. at 127.
63. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
64. 406 U.S. at 545.
65. 406 U.S. 598 (1972); see note 16 supra.
66. 413 U.S. at 421.
67. See notes 19-46 supra and accompanying text.
19741
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
ing class."8 In light of this, perhaps the Court was only distinguishing
Townsend on its facts, and not discussing its proper' application. If
this is indeed the case, then the approach of Parks, Mixon, and
Wisdom to the Townsend rule finds no support in either Townsend
itself or Jefferson and Dublino. Consequently, the courts that have
favored the inclusion of unborn children would seem justified in
their holding even though it appears that only the broadest interpre-
tation would permit a finding- of mandatory eligibility for the un-
born.
The unborn child cases illustrate the difficulty of a rule such as
Townsend which allows courts the power of broad construction.
Given wide discretion, different courts will reach different conclu-
sions regarding the persuasiveness of the evidence. The unborn child
cases also point to the problem of ambiguously drawn legislation
which often forces courts-to redefine statutes with questionable au-
thorization from Congress. The conclusion to be drawn is that in the
absence of a rule that would require a showing of specific eligibility,
controversies similar to the unborn child cases are apt to reoccur.
The Supreme-Court has granted certiorari in Alcala v. Burns."
Hopefully the Court will provide more specific guidelines for the
review of state welfare programs, thereby resolving the Townsend
controversy and allowing courts to more effectively deal with the
difficult task of statutory construction.
John K. Enright
68. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
69. 43 U.S.L.W. 3187 (U.S. Oct.' 15, 1974).
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